On February 12, Bangladesh will hold a parliamentary election alongside a referendum. The referendum asks voters to approve the so-called July Charter, a framework that would authorise the next parliament to amend the Constitution and recalibrate key institutional arrangements. Although old allies, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami, are contesting the election in separate streams, both have urged voters to support a “Yes” vote.
Amid this political churn, attention has turned sharply toward India, Bangladesh’s largest neighbour. With the traditionally pro-India Awami League barred from the electoral contest by a state-imposed ban, many now believe that New Delhi is backing the BNP under Tarique Rahman’s leadership. This perception is striking, given the troubled state of India–Bangladesh relations between 2001 and 2006.
During that period, the Khaleda Zia government was marked by deep mutual distrust, an openly anti-India posture, close alignment with Pakistan, and allegations of support for insurgent groups operating in India’s Northeast. The question, therefore, is unavoidable: why would India now place its weight behind the BNP?
Coming back to the referendum issue, the public has little clarity about parliament’s role afterward, even if the referendum passes. Many assume that, as in the past — when parliament legitimised the actions of illegal military regimes — the new parliament will again serve as the central legitimising authority.
Bangladesh’s political history suggests that the ruling side has always prevailed in such referendums. This time the context is different. During the eras of Ziaur Rahman and HM Ershad, referendums were held well before elections and asked a single, narrow question: whether the public trusted the new presidents after their transition from military rule.
This referendum, by contrast, seeks blanket approval for constitutional amendments and other unspecified measures. What those measures entail remains unclear. The issue has become so contentious that Rehman Sobhan, one of the country’s most senior intellectuals, economists, and freedom fighters, has publicly stated: “The people of this country have been deceived over this referendum.” Consequently, the political trajectory Bangladesh will follow after 12 February remains deeply uncertain.
Questions on inclusivity
Another striking feature of the election concerns inclusivity. In 2024, BNP boycotted the polls but was not banned, and its political activities continued normally. Nevertheless, Western governments declared that election non-inclusive because BNP supporters did not participate. In the current election, however, the country’s largest party — the Awami League — has been administratively banned from contesting.
Despite this, the West now describes the election as inclusive, arguing that inclusivity depends only on voters’ ability to cast ballots, not on the participation of major parties. As often in Asia and Africa, Western definitions of democracy appear inconsistent, shaped less by principle than by commercial and strategic interests such as energy, ports, and trade.
All eyes are on India’s role
India’s role has also become a source of growing unease. From the change of state power on August 5, 2024 until November 2025, India consistently called for an inclusive election grounded in democratic norms. Since late November, however, many in Bangladesh’s progressive and liberal circles believe India has retreated from that position. This perception — particularly among those who have traditionally respected India’s democratic credentials — has introduced a new and troubling uncertainty into public discourse.
Public reactions to India’s extensive expressions of condolence following the death of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia have further fueled speculation. A politically conscious majority has concluded that India has not only revised its stance on inclusivity, but — just as it was seen to back Sheikh Hasina in 2024 — is now perceived as supporting Tarique Rahman. Even BNP leaders and supporters increasingly assume that Indian backing alone will be sufficient to carry them across the electoral threshold.
As in 2024, this election has generated no popular wave. In one-sided contests, electoral momentum rarely emerges, and public opinion surveys lose relevance. Some foreign surveys appear plausible, but polls published by a few anti–Sheikh Hasina newspapers are so detached from reality as to be self-evidently unreliable.
In essence, this election differs little in character from that of 2024. Then, the contest was largely between Awami League alliance candidates and their own alliance’s “independents” — the so-called “I and dummy” election. This time, despite appearances, the structure is similar. BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami are not merely natural allies; they have practised alliance politics for three decades.
Unlike the Awami League alliance, where the larger party sets policy, Jamaat has historically shaped policy within the BNP-Jamaat alliance despite being the smaller partner — a dynamic once captured by BNP leader Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury’s remark that “the dog wags because of the tail.” With the alliance now contesting in divided streams, the election again resembles an “I and dummy” arrangement.
The key difference from 2024 is uncertainty. Then, the outcome was clear: the Awami League alliance would win regardless of turnout. This time, it is unclear whether the “I” or the “dummy” will prevail, or where the true favour of power lies. One notable indicator, however, is that the National Citizens Party (NCP), formed by the students who elevated Muhammad Yunus, is aligned with Jamaat-e-Islami.
Many Bangladeshis now believe that India prefers a BNP victory under Tarique Rahman. Yet fundamental questions remain unanswered: parliament’s authority after the referendum, the formation of government, and the scope of prime-ministerial power. When these matters are opaque even to an intellectual of Rehman Sobhan’s stature, they are inevitably incomprehensible to ordinary citizens.
Will Tarique serve India’s interests?
If Tarique Rahman does form a government, the central question will be whether his leadership serves India’s interests more effectively than Sheikh Hasina’s — and what Bangladesh itself stands to gain. History suggests that stronger domestic leaders extract greater international concessions.
Khaleda Zia, though far more popular than her son, failed during her decade in office to secure Bangladesh’s fair share of Ganges water or resolve major bilateral disputes. Meanwhile, her finance minister Saifur Rahman opened Bangladesh’s markets to largely unrestricted Indian imports.
By contrast, Sheikh Hasina resolved three landmark issues with India: the 30-year Ganges Water Treaty in 1996; the maritime boundary settlements with India and Myanmar after 2009; and the implementation of the Land Boundary Agreement after 2014, through which Bangladesh gained 10,000 acres. She also secured access to Indian airports for garment exports and opened northeastern Indian markets by eliminating insurgency sanctuaries — benefits that were withdrawn immediately after her fall.
She achieved these outcomes because she was a towering political figure domestically and internationally. As India’s own leaders once acknowledged, she possessed a rare capacity to resolve regional disputes. Replacing her with Tarique Rahman — whose international reputation is already well established — offers little reason to expect comparable leverage.
This transition also coincides with India’s hardening stance on downstream water, following its annulment of the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan. The Bangladesh–India Ganges Water Treaty expires this year. If Pakistan struggles under India’s current posture, what can Bangladesh realistically expect under a weaker leadership? Past experience under Ziaur Rahman — marked by Farakka marches and unresolved disputes — offers little reassurance.
Whether India will reopen northeastern markets, restore airport access, or extend similar concessions remains uncertain. The question is not only whether Tarique Rahman can secure such outcomes, but whether both sides can move beyond the legacy of unresolved security and geopolitical controversies.
Disclaimer
Views expressed above are the author’s own.
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