ASEAN enters 2026 confronting a convergence of strategic challenges that threaten to test both its cohesion and its relevance. At the centre of these challenges lies the South China Sea (SCS), where China’s increasingly assertive behaviour continues to undermine regional stability, international law, and ASEAN’s capacity to act collectively.
The most immediate challenge stems from China’s accelerated militarisation of disputed maritime features. Beijing continues to create and expand artificial islands, particularly in the Paracel and Spratly Islands. In the Paracels, reports point to substantial land reclamation, including a newly dredged harbour on Tree Island, expansion around North Island, and the construction of a land bridge linking Palm and Duncan Islands. In the Spratlys, Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef have been transformed into major military outposts, equipped with long runways, hardened aircraft shelters, radar systems, and fuel storage facilities. Triton Island, closer to Vietnam’s coast, has also seen significant upgrades, including a new helipad and sovereignty markings. More recently, China has reportedly begun constructing the world’s first nuclear-blast-resistant floating artificial island, designed for long-term deployment in the SCS, marking a new and unsettling phase of militarisation.
Second, China has intensified calibrated, multi-domain pressure to change facts on the ground, with the Philippines and Vietnam as primary targets. Any escalation of Chinese actions against Taiwan would further destabilise the region, intensifying US-China rivalry and placing enormous stress on ASEAN unity.
Third, the prospects for finalising a meaningful and binding Code of Conduct (CoC) with China remain bleak. Negotiations continue to stall over disagreements regarding legal status, geographic scope, and enforcement mechanisms, undermining ASEAN’s credibility in managing the dispute.
Fourth, China’s activities have caused severe ecological damage. Large-scale dredging has destroyed coral reefs, altered current patterns, and led to the estimated loss of 12 to 18 square kilometres of reef habitat, with long-term consequences for marine biodiversity and regional livelihoods.
Fifth, China continues to strengthen its domestic legal framework to justify its actions in the SCS, adding to existing laws that authorise its forces to act against foreign vessels. Renaming maritime features is going on with an intensified psychological and media campaign based on disinformation.
Sixth, ASEAN unity is under strain. While Vietnam and the Philippines seek a firmer ASEAN position grounded in UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral ruling, other members prioritise economic ties with China or prefer strategic ambiguity. Continued coercion risks further weakening respect for international law.
Finally, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), based on an inclusive and cooperative vision of regional order, faces growing challenges amid intensified great-power rivalry.
The above developments demand that the ASEAN members must effectively coordinate their responses. Vietnam is well placed to assume a leadership role as its influence extends beyond its chairmanships. As a coordinator of ASEAN’s relations with key partners like Russia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the UK, the US, and New Zealand, Vietnam has earned a reputation for its sincerity and trustworthiness.
As the most vocal and resilient ASEAN state in pushing back against Chinese assertiveness, Vietnam combines firm resistance with calibrated diplomacy. Its high-level partnerships with major powers and close relations within ASEAN give it unique leverage. It has emerged as a powerful central pillar of diplomacy for all ASEAN members.
Significantly, the 14th National Congress of the CPV provided strategic endorsement for sustaining and deepening Vietnam’s ASEAN engagement, rooted in continuity with a clear long-term vision and operational emphasis supportive of ASEAN’s evolving role in the region. Vietnamese Minister of Foreign Affairs Le Hoai Trung, while briefing ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the 29th January 2026, about the outcome of the 14th Congress, stated that Vietnam’s domestic and foreign policies are in alignment with the ASEAN Vision of 2045 and is committed to a united and resilient ASEAN Community. He underlined Vietnam’s active role as Coordinator for ASEAN-New Zealand and ASEAN-UK relations for 2024–2027, including co-organising activities to mark the fifth anniversary of the ASEAN–UK Dialogue Partnership in 2026. He called on ASEAN to proactively adapt with unity, strategic vision and collective action, including reviewing and improving confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and dispute-settlement mechanisms.
Given the complex growing regional and global challenges, Vietnam should pursue the following steps. First, Vietnam should continue to anchor its resistance in international law. Persistent diplomatic emphasis on UNCLOS, freedom of navigation, and peaceful dispute settlement strengthens Vietnam’s legitimacy and raises the reputational cost for China. Trung’s suggestion, for the establishment of a consultation mechanism among legal advisers on international law, is timely. While persuading ASEAN members to emphasise the implementation of the 2016 Arbitral ruling will be difficult, sustained effort remains essential. The value of its judgement needs to be publicised through international seminars and conferences while celebrating its tenth anniversary this year.
Second, Hanoi must strengthen ASEAN’s deterrence through capacity building. Enhancing maritime domain awareness, coast guard capabilities, and non-military enforcement tools empower to resist coercion without escalating militarily. Investments in surveillance, information sharing, and rapid response are particularly critical in grey-zone scenarios.
Third, Vietnam should actively shape ASEAN outcomes by working with like-minded members such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
Fourth, Vietnam should encourage more forcefully other members of ASEAN for cooperation with important powers for the implementation of AOIP. Maritime security, disaster relief, infrastructure, and technology, can be framed as developmental and defensive rather than military alignment.
Fifth, collective economic resilience must be strengthened through diversification of trade and supply chains. The India-ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, which is currently under review, should be upgraded for better connectivity.
Sixth, the need for more vigorously countering China’s propaganda to justify its claims on the SCS cannot be underestimated. Historical facts, which favour Vietnam’s claims, should be extensively used to expose China’s fabricated narrative.
By combining legal diplomacy, capacity building, coalition-making within ASEAN, and diversified partnerships, Vietnam can continue to act as a stabilising force in the SCS, protecting both national interests and the rules-based maritime order vital for regional peace. ASEAN’s unity and success in dealing with the strategic challenges are critical not only for India’s economy but also for the entire region and beyond.
Disclaimer
Views expressed above are the author’s own.
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